That page of course only has room for one… But thats later.

The geopolitical gurus at Stratfor make the following analysis of the ongoing negotiations between the US and Iran (subscription only):

Iran handed over a proposal to [U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan] Crocker during a brief encounter at the May 5-6 Sharm el-Sheikh summit in Egypt, but also chose to unofficially publicize its terms for Iraq through the Saudi-owned, British-based daily Al Hayat. The Iranian Foreign Ministry likely chose Al Hayat, a major Arab news outlet, to make a back-channel broadcast of what concessions it is prepared to make to allay Sunni concerns in the region.

In sum, this Iranian proposal called for a non-rushed withdrawal and relocation of U.S. troops to bases inside Iraq, a rejection of all attempts to partition Iraq, a commitment by the Sunni bloc to root out the jihadists and acknowledgement by Washington that the Iranian nuclear file cannot be uncoupled from the Iraq negotiations. In return, Iran would rein in the armed Shiite militias, revise the de-Baathification law and Iraqi Constitution to double Sunni political representation, create a policy to allow for the fair distribution of oil revenues (particularly to the Sunnis) and use its regional influence to quell crises in areas such as Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories.

The terms put forth by the Iranians are so close to the U.S. position on Iraq that, with little exception, they could have been printed on State Department stationary and no one would have noticed the difference. If these are the terms Washington and Tehran are in fact discussing, then we are witnessing an extraordinary turn in the Iraq war in which the U.S. and Iranian blueprints for Iraq are finally aligning. It does not surprise us, then, that Crocker said after his meeting in Baghdad that the Iranian position “was very close to our own” at the level of policy and principle.

Extraordinary indeed. So is this finally a light at the end of tunnel? Maybe, except for a few small problems. Stratfor lists the problems as follows:

• The transnational Sunni Jihadists with their dreams of an Islamic State of Iraq
• the severely and perhaps irreconcilably split Iraqi Shia who are likely to a little rough on each other sooner rather than later
• the much less splintered Iraqi Sunnis, who, although by and large online with these negotiations must be satisfied of their future safety and a slice of the pie in the Shia dominated Iraq (these guarantees are already part of the deal)
• the Iraqi Kurds, who are the Iraqi faction that stands to lose most out of the above settlement and are not about to give up what they’ve worked so hard to finally achieve in Kurdistan
• Ultraconservatives in Washington and Tehran who “can’t negotiate with those people”
• Sunni Regional Powers with that whole Shia Crescent thing on their mind
• Syria, who is feeling pretty important, if not immune right now while the Great Satan is all tied up elsewhere and they are useful to Iran
• Russia, which has really been making the best of the US and Iranian preoccupation in Iraq and would be quite unhappy to have to start caring what the Americans (and even the much closer Iranians) think again

How is that light looking now?

Below are excerpts from an interview with a very interesting fellow called Rory Stewart. Here’s a bit about him:

Rory Stewart is chief executive of the Turquoise Mountain Foundation, a non-profit organization in Kabul devoted to social and urban redevelopment in Afghanistan. A former member of the British Foreign Office, he served, from 2003 to 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq as Deputy Governor of the southern provinces of Maysan and Dhi Qar, an experience he described in the book The Prince of the Marshes.[*] The following text is based on Stewart’s dialogue about Iraq with audience members, after his discussion with broadcast journalist Dan Harris, at the Asia Society in New York on April 20, 2007.

Rory on the reconstruction effort:

Woman in audience: I wanted to know since you were in Afghanistan in 2002, and then had left and gone to Iraq in 2003–2004, what made you want to go back and live there?

Rory Stewart: The experience that I had in Iraq was a disillusioning one. Originally I supported the invasion because I had served in Indonesia, the Balkans, and Afghanistan and I thought Iraq could be more stable and humane than it had been under Saddam. I realized in Iraq that I had been wrong. I was working for the British government as coalition deputy governor of the southern provinces of Maysan and Dhi Qar and I had by April 2004 $10 million a month delivered to me in vacuum-sealed packets which we were supposed to be dispensing in order to get programs going. And almost none of the programs caught the imagination of the local population; and then I was facing hundreds of people demonstrating outside my office day after day, saying, “What has the coalition ever done for us?” And we restored 240 out of 400 schools; we restored all the clinics and hospitals; but nobody seemed interested or remotely engaged with the process.

There were only two projects we did that I thought had some kind of impact: one of them was the restoration of the bazaar in al-Amara, the capital of Maysan province, and the other was the creation of a carpentry school for street children in Nasiriyah. The carpentry school took two hundred children and had them go through a pretty good training course in carpentry and then found them jobs. It was the one project where suddenly we had the Iraqi police chief and the Iraqi mayor of Nasiriyah visiting it, and Iraqi television stations and al-Jazeera covering it, and people seemed gripped by it.

So coming to Afghanistan again in 2005, I saw that a quarter of the historic city of Kabul was due to be demolished again. They had resurrected the 1976 East German master plan under which it was to be flattened and replaced with East German–style concrete blocks. And I discovered that people like Ustad Abdul Hadi, who had been among the most famous craftsmen in the country, were selling fruit in the marketplace, the historic buildings were collapsing, and the garbage was seven feet deep in the street. Afghans wanted jobs, incomes, and a renewed sense of national identity. I sensed that restoring the traditional commercial center of the city and creating a crafts center that would make furniture, ceramics, and textiles would not only be good for the economy but would also catch imaginations. I could not undertake this kind of project in Baghdad. Those are some of the things that came together to make me do it. [..]

Moderator: Does the carpentry school still exist in Nasiriyah?

The carpentry school in Nasiriyah does not still exist, unfortunately. The funding stopped. It ran out of money.

I’d like to hear his thoughts on why “nobody in Iraq was interested or remotely engaged with the process” or reconstruction. Resentment, cultural differences, fear, stubbornness, prejudice, all of the above?

And his thoughts on withdrawal:

[.] I believe that the time has come to withdraw, that our presence is infantilizing the Iraqi political system. That we’re like an inadequate antibiotic. We are sufficiently strong to have turned what might have been a conventional civil war into a highly unconventional neighborhood conflict. But we’re not strong enough to eliminate it entirely. At the same time I fear that, without intending to, we have discredited democracy in the eyes of many Iraqis. We have created a situation in which many Iraqis now feel that the only way to keep security is to bring back a strongman. They are extremely skeptical of our programs and suggestions for development.

I think that Iraqi politicians are considerably more competent, canny, and capable of compromise than we acknowledge. Iraqi nationalism, in my view, can trump the Shiite–Sunni divisions. Our continuing presence is encouraging Iraqi politicians to play hard-ball with each other. Were we to leave, they would be weaker and under more pressure to compromise. In our relations with the Iraqis we often blocked negotiations with Moqtada al-Sadr or Sunni insurgency leaders, or the offer of troop withdrawals and amnesties for former Baathists and insurgents, among others. Yet these will probably be elements in any kind of settlement.

And therefore, my belief—and I emphasize this is my belief, not a certainty—is that were we to withdraw, things would improve

He goes on to further explain his reasoning and why he believes even the prospect of region-wide escalation or intervention by neghbouring states do not trump the reasons for withdrawal. I think he perhaps underestimates the ruthless determination of the Iranians and the extent to which they have already penetrated Iraqi society and the implications of this for the long term stability of the whole region. Iraq’s future is no longer a matter between the US and the various Iraqi factions. On a strategic level it is largely a matter between the US and Iran. Steward addresses the possibility of Iranian invasion or Iranian destabilisation of Iraq with covert operations. The problem is they may have already consolidated their power base in the Shiite regions too far for either option to be necessary. And then there is the question of what would happen to Kurdistan in the event of an complete withdrawal.

MEMRI has extensive quotes from three liberal Arab authors who have criticized the support for terrorism in Arab and Muslim society. Here’s what two of the them had to say.

Iraqi Author Riyadh ‘Abd compares the reaction of Virginia Tech killer Cho Seung-Hui’s family to that of families of suicide bombers in Iraq:

“What caught my attention was a report… that the criminal’s family… offered its apologies and expressed grief, embarrassment, and shame, as well as consternation and incomprehension of their son Cho Seung-Hui’s atrocious crime… This Korean family expressed a sense of sadness and grief, profound remorse, and a sense of partial responsibility for what their son did.

“Let’s compare this natural, human, civilized behavior that places value on human life with [that of] the families of Arabs in Islamic lands who lost their sons in Iraq in criminal suicide operations whose victims number tens of thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians.

“Instead of the Iraqis receiving apologies and feelings of grief and consolation for these filthy criminals’ killing and slaughtering of innocents and their demolishing and destroying of property, we see the families of these killers holding mourning ceremonies and bragging of the ‘martyrdom’ of their sons the mujahideen - [and at these ceremonies] they receive congratulations instead of condolences.

“This strange behavior and sick pride in criminal acts can only be explained as a conclusive sign of the moral decline and deterioration of contemporary Islamic and Arab civilization.”

“Don’t the Iraqi People Deserve an Apology From the Family” of Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi?

“There are hundreds of examples of this barbaric and disgraceful behavior, from Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries. Where is the apology from the family of the barbaric criminal, the beheader known as Abu Mus’ab Al-Zarqawi, to the Iraqi people for the crimes of mass murder, destruction of property, and cutting off [people’s] livelihoods? Don’t the Iraqis deserve an apology from the family, tribe, and village of this dirty scoundrel?

“Where is the apology from the family of the Jordanian criminal who caused the deaths of 200 innocent civilians in Al-Hilla, in a suicide bombing in a popular market in 2005? It is known that there was a large mourning ceremony after the death of this criminal, that was attended by a number of important Jordanian statesmen…

“I read an article from a few years ago about an attempt by CNN… to interview, in Cairo, the father of the criminal Muhammad ‘Atta, the commander of the group responsible for [9/11]… It is known that this individual had at first spread made-up stories about the Mossad kidnapping his son, stories snatched up at the time by the Egyptian media, which is known for its addiction to invented stories and raving analyses…

“Later he began to brag about what his son did, calling his abominable criminal act ‘jihad.’ When CNN asked him for an interview, he made it contingent upon them paying him $5,000 for it. When they told him that it is station policy not to pay interviewees, Muhammad ‘Atta’s father turned down the interview, claiming that a Muslim is not allowed to aid the infidels without remuneration. Did the Muslims disapprove of this disgraceful position?… I don’t think so.

Saudi author Rim Al-Salih wrote about the differences between the Virginia Tech killer and the culture of Islamic terrorism:

[..] without lying to ourselves, can we compare the crime committed by an individual due to madness, mental illness, depression, or even due to the desire to kill and avenge, and the death supported by organizations, fatwas, [TV] stations, websites, funding by the millions, and pledges of allegiance taken in front of the holy Ka’ba?…

“The sanctification of death for death’s sake is a distinctly Islamic-Arabic specialization. Coveting death, suicide, and the killing of innocents as a shortcut to Paradise is not shared by anyone else among Allah’s creation. Is there any non-Arab who cuts the throat of journalists and peace workers - [people] who left their homes to do a true service or to aid our causes - for the crime of being fair-skinned and because of their eye color?…

“Some even go so far as to accuse the news channels of treason if they use the words ‘killing’ or ‘killed’ [instead of ‘martyrdom’ and ‘martyr’], despite the fact that these terms are more accurate. Our vulgarization of the term ‘martyrdom’ (shahada) has made it lose its meaning, and death has lost its value and awe. The martyrdom-seeking (istishhad) of the Arabs has become like a reward for them, instead of a disaster or a calamity…

“The exaggeration in sanctifying death has made many youth prefer taking a shortcut to Paradise, instead of obeying the will of the Creator, who considers whoever kills one soul without justification as though he has killed all humanity, and considers whoever saves one life as though he has saved all humanity. [The Creator] wants [this youth] to strive to work, to live, to use the great energies he granted him in order to make the world flourish, and to leave his human imprint on existence…”

MEMRI also has quotes from Kuwaiti columnist Khalil ‘Ali Haydar who gives 10 differences between Islamist terrorism and other forms of extremism and terrorism in the non-Muslim world.

Yet another Muslim Arab author who has been bitterly speaking out about the decline of his culture is the Syrian poet Adonis (Ali Ahmad Said):

“I don’t understand what is happening in Arab society today. I don’t know how to interpret this situation, except by making the following hypothesis: When I look at the Arab world, with all its resources, the capacities of Arab individuals, especially abroad–you will find among them great philosophers, scientists, engineers, and doctors. In other words, the Arab individual is no less smart, no less a genius, than anyone else in the world. He can excel–but only outside his society. I have nothing against the individuals–only against the institutions and the regimes.

“If I look at the Arabs, with all their resources and great capacities, and I compare what they have achieved over the past century with what others have achieved in that period, I would have to say that we Arabs are in a phase of extinction, in the sense that we have no creative presence in the world.”

Interviewer: “Are we on the brink of extinction, or are we already extinct?”

Adonis: “We have become extinct. We have the quantity. We have the masses of people, but a people becomes extinct when it no longer has a creative capacity, and the capacity to change its world.”

[. . .]

“The great Sumerians became extinct, the great Greeks became extinct, and the Pharaohs became extinct. The clearest sign of this extinction is when we intellectuals continue to think in the context of this extinction.”

Interviewer: “That is very dangerous.”

Adonis: “That is our real intellectual crisis. We are facing a new world with ideas that no longer exist, and in a context that is obsolete. We must sever ourselves completely from that context, on all levels, and think of a new Arab identity, a new culture, and a new Arab society.”

[. . .]

“Imagine that Arab societies had no Western influence. What would be left? The Muslims must . . .”

Interviewer: “What would be left?”

Adonis: “Nothing. Nothing would be left except for the mosque, the church, and commerce, of course.”

[. . .]

“The Muslims today–forgive me for saying this–with their accepted interpretation [of the religious text], are the first to destroy Islam, whereas those who criticize the Muslims–the non-believers, the infidels, as they call them–are the ones who perceive in Islam the vitality that could adapt it to life. These infidels serve Islam better than the believers.”

A fascinating insight into what went on behind the scenes in Israel in the lead up to the Second Lebanese War, from an article by Caroline Glick:

At first glance the [Winograd Committee’s] report reads like an ideological indictment. The commission wrote that a great portion of the blame for the lack of preparedness of both the government and the IDF was rooted in the belief that “the era of big wars had ended.” Yet that belief did not stand on its own. It is rooted in the Left’s peace ideology.

This ideology maintains that even if a country is forced to fight a war, the aim of the war is to remain at the starting gate and give the enemy what it wants, not to defeat it. The belief that the era of wars is over stems directly from the Left’s ideological commitment to the belief that everyone is a potential negotiating partner.

The report demonstrates that from the outset of the war, it was this view that informed the decisions of both the government and the IDF. The report relates a notable exchange between Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Halutz during the cabinet meeting on July 12 when the decision to go to war was made. Livni asked Halutz, “What is victory?”

Halutz responded, “There is no victory here….What we need to do is to respond with a sufficiently strong reaction that will call the international forces to get involved and to intervene at the proper intervention points in order to place pressure on the right forces.”

Livni testified before the commission that the next day the Foreign Ministry began preparing position papers setting out the government’s preferred end state: foreign forces on the border separating the IDF from an undefeated Hizbullah.

And now to a far more important piece of the puzzle: evoking the “Away From My Desk” effect. More revealing quotes, this time from an Israeli General Staff meeting in the lead-up to the war (h/t Normblog):

Gentleman C: On the table before each of you, you’ll find a comprehensive study compiled by Middle East 101, looking at the academic year factor in Israel’s wars since 1948. What we’ve done is a statistical comparison of the amount of anti-Israel verbiage expended by American and European professors in all of Israel’s wars. I draw your attention to Table 8. You’ll see that in every war, our military operations have taken less incoming criticism during summer months. We call this the “Away From My Desk” effect. Professors on summer break are less likely to write op-eds and show up in the media. There aren’t any students to attend their campus teach-ins, and there’s no student press to cover them.

Bottom line is that summer remains an ideal time to launch a war. The operational readiness of academe is at its lowest.

But back to the serious stuff. The former IDF chief of General Staff Dan Halutz may no longer believe in victory. But here are some people that do. The following quotes from a sermon from Friday before last by the acting Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council, Sheik Ahmad Bahr:

   Ahmad Bahr began: ‘“You will be victorious” on the face of this planet. You are the masters of the world on the face of this planet. Yes, [the Koran says that] “you will be victorious,” but only “if you are believers.” Allah willing, “you will be victorious,” while America and Israel will be annihilated. I guarantee you that the power of belief and faith is greater than the power of America and Israel. They are cowards who are eager for life, while we are eager for death for the sake of Allah. That is why America’s nose was rubbed in the mud in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Somalia, and everywhere.

   Bahr continued and said that America will be annihilated, while Islam will remain. The Muslims ‘“will be victorious, if you are believers.” Oh Muslims, I guarantee you that the power of Al