The Caucasus is a region where the memory of war is all too recent and its horrors all too familiar, yet despite that its return is seemingly all but inevitable again. For centuries located at the meeting point of three empires - the Russian/Soviet, the Iranian/Persian and the Turkish/Ottoman, the Caucasus been a battle ground where these empires fought each other and fought to subdue the ethnic Caucasian nations and tribes, while the Caucasians fought each other. The temporary stability enforced by the Soviet Union evaporated with it and the 90s saw a number of conflicts ignite or reignite in the region. As recently as a year or two ago it seemed that the Caucasus was again heading for a lasting stability, besides the ongoing, although hushed up, Chechen insurgency that is, as Westerm influence grew in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan and Russia itself was still keeping up some appearance of embracing Western style democracy.
How much things have changed in a year.
Another war in the Caucasus is on the way. And not necessarily in the shape that a scan of current news headlines may bring to mind.
Russia reloads.
By default the suspicion for any destabilisation of the region first falls on Russia, the “re-emerging empire”, as the Georgian President Sakashvilli recently referred to it. So far its “re-emergence” has mostly been by non-military means, ie via its all but official foreign policy of energy blackmail. Re-enabling it’s military options however is evidently on the minds of Moscow’s policy makers too. Russia has increased its national defence budget from 140 billion rubles ($5.2 billion) in 2001, to 870 billion rubles ($32.4 billion) in 2007. Thats an increase of more than 6 times. What these numbers translate to in terms of strategic capabilities is of course another matter - how this money is spent is shrouded in secrecy, as tends to be the case in authoritarian regimes, and budget secrecy has the downside of massive built in inefficiency. (In light of which perhaps Putin should rethink his personal motto of “Get rich and keep quiet”. What is that about?) The Russian military consists of between 1.3 and 4 million people, depending on how you define “military” - an area where the Russians like to get creative, depending on the impression they seek to project - which suggests an expensive luxury.
Said Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov last month:
“When I came to the Defense Ministry, its budget was some 140 billion rubles. This was in 2001. The figure that has almost been agreed upon for 2007 is about 870 billion rubles. As they say, compare and feel the difference”
Georgian overconfidence.
One Caucasian nation that could really be “feeling the difference” is of course Georgia, incidentally the fastest-arming country in the world, which has two regions attempting to secede and join Russia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia is making a nice profit from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that went online in June, and is expected to produce about 1.5% of its national income. Much like increased oil revenue has allowed the Russians its military spending indulgences, Georgia has been using its newly acquired funds (recently offset by the Russian blockade) for a massive beefing up of its military, Jane’s reports:
Under Minister of Defence Irakli Okruashvili, Georgian militarisation is proceeding apace. Spending has risen from less than USD25 million in 2002 to an exceptional USD337 million in 2006; from 0.7 to 5 per cent of GDP. Maximum force strength has been increased and an army reserve of 100,000 trained civilians is being created. Significant stocks of armoured vehicles, artillery and attack helicopters have been procured. A major ‘NATO-standard’ base has been constructed close to Abkhazia and another is underway near South Ossetia.
It now seems that it is Georgia that has overplayed its hand with its recent posturing over the Russian spy scandal, while attempting to draw international attention to Russian encouragement of its separatist regions. Not only have the Russians come down hard on Georgia, international condemnation has also been falling on the Georgians for initially escalating the affair. Counting on Western support President Mikhail Saakashvili may be preparing for an attempt to regain control of the break away regions by force. The Russians on the other hand are drawing attention to the various new nations whose separatist movements the West has encouraged - most recently Montenegro, and most importantly in the near future, Kosovo - as examples of Western self-serving hypocrisy.
Burning for vengeance in the Land of Eternal Fire.
But of course the possibility of confict between Georgia and Russia is a surprise to noone right now. In fact there is another conflict in the Caucasus which seems far more certain.
Also benefitting nicely from the BTC pipeline, but lacking the media attention, is Georgia’s neighbour, Azerbaijan, the economy of which is expected to grow 18% as a result of the pipeline. Like Georgia it is spending much of its profits on arming itself. On October 18th Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev announced that Azerbaijan’s defense expenditures will rise to $1 billion in 2007. Thats compared to $300 million in 2005. The Azeris fought a war with Armenia after the parliament of its Nagorno-Karabakh region, which has an Armenian majority, voted to join Armenia back in 1988. The first Nagorno-Karabakh War ended in 1994, claiming about 35,000 lives. In that conflict Armenia’s military proved superior. Now Azerbaijan is getting busy attempting to correct its disatvantage. Armenia on the other hand, which has no oil to sell, had a defence budget of $160 million this year and their entire national budget in 2005 was $930.7 million, which is less than next year’s defence budget alone for the Azeris. The status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region remains disputed, with no country officially recognising its independence. Armenia and Azerbaijan remain at a stand off, technically still at war, however the regions outskirts are currently a site of daily skirmishes and sniper attacks which, together with landmines claim about a 100 lives a year. 2006 was seen as a window of opportunity for resolving the conflict with diplomacy, as neither nation had an election this year. The window is fast closing. Some progress has been made in negotiating the return of areas that Armenia occupied during the last war that were strategically important for the defence of Nagorno-Karabakh. But the real source of their disagreements - the status of Nagorno-Karabakh itself - is no closer to resolution than it was a decade ago.
An incident that reflects the depths of the animosity between the two nations occured in Budapest, Hungary, in 2004 at a training seminar which was part of the Partnership for Peace NATO-sponsored program. One early morning an Azerbaijani officer, Ramil Safarov, came into the bedroom where the Armenian Lieutenant Gurgen Markaryan was sleeping and hacked him to death with an axe. In response to the incident the human rights commissioner of Azerbaijan, Elmira Suleymanova, stated that “Safarov must become an example of patriotism for the Azerbaijani youth.” An Azeri political scientist, Zardusht Alizade, is also quoted as saying that Safarov “will be raised to the status of a national hero”. And Farida Askerova, Chairwoman of the Organization for the Liberation of Karabakh women’s board: “The young people ought to be ready for the holy war; every mother must raise a son to fight for the Motherland”.
And in February of this year, the following from Iskander Gamidov of the opposition National Democratic Party of Azerbaijan:
“Maybe in a month, maybe in a year or two, but sooner or later war will be inevitable. We should prepare for it and prepare society,” This was said a roundtable meeting titled ‘Prospects for the Karabakh settlement by military means’.
In a recent development Arkady Gukasian, the President of Nagorno-Karabakh signed a decree on November 3rd to hold a referendum Dec. 10 regarding the draft of the Nagorno-Karabakh Constitution.
The big question is who the major regional and world powers will back in the conflict. The US is likely to do everything in its power to prevent a war. Firstly there are more Armenians in the US than in Armenia, making for a powerful lobby. Secondly the US has growing economic interests in Azerbaijan, due to energy investments. Azerbaijan has been growing into a regional energy hub, both as a source of oil and a post of transit from Caspian oil and gas from Central Asia. In addition Azerbijian is a potential, although reluctant ally against Iran. Also there are more Azeris in Iran than in Azerbijian, 17 million or 24% of Iran’s population in fact, something Iran is uneasy about. In any case Iran has been developing its ties with Armenia, in part to counter Turkish influence in Azerbaijan and in part to keep a lever against Baku. There is little scope for the US to take sides in any confict here - it wants the region stable. As does the EU, which is looking to diversify its energy sources away from Russia. If absolutely forced however the US would have to side with the Azeris. But Azeribaijan’s closest ally and firmest backer is Turkey, with many Azeri officers currently studying there. A Turkish trained and advised army fighting against Armenia adds another grim dimension to the developments (the official position of the Azeri government on the Armenian genocide, by the way, is one of outright denial). Moscow, although not hostile to Azerbaijan per se, is closely allied, through the CSTO, with Armenia, where it is has been aggressively buying up infrastructure and has as its ultimate goal control of the whole Caucasus.
An overcrowded chessboard.
And this is far from the end of the the smoldering problems in the Caucasus. The trouble for the Russians is far from over in Chechnya and is perhaps only starting in surrounding regions like Dagestan, North Ossetia and Ingushetia, no matter how hard Moscow likes to pretend it has the situation there under control. And the trouble hasn’t even started yet for the various foreign companies that have been investing in Caspian oil and gas and building pipelines across the Caucasus going through to the Black Sea and Turkey. The Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s (CPC) pipeline is the only pipeline on Russian soil that is not owned and controlled by the Russians - something Moscow is intent on remedying. They are also far from happy about any pipes taking energy resources out of Central Asia via any other route they don’t control, ie across Russian territory. As American influence has weakened in the region the Russians are growing bolder in enforcing their desires on their neighbours - and energy has been been their favored lever to push. The BTC pipeline, which passes through Azerbaijan and Georgia (avoiding CSTO member Armenia) into Turkey, drags a host of Western interests directly into the line of Russian ire, although that was part of the reason it was installed in the first place - Western economic involvement, and thus influence, in the region was one of the objectives, not a side effect. In reality should war break out the de facto over-involvement may morph into a liability. Kazakhstan also has a significant stake on oil sent through the BTC and another pipeline in a similar direction is likely in a couple of years for their massive Kashagan field in the north of the Caspian Sea. And lets not forget the Iranians. It was only in the 19th century that parts of the Caucasus, particularly in what is now Azerbaijan, were part of their empire, before the Czarist Russia made it a part of theirs. Iranian influence amongst the Shia of Azerbaijan has been increasing, as it has among all the Shia populations in the Middle East. Azeri President Ilham Aliyev has recently spoken out in support of the Iranians’ right to nuclear power development. At the same time Armenia’s relationship with Iran has also been warming. Armenia is reliant on Russia and Iran for its energy and has Russian military bases on its territory. As already mentioned, it is a member of the Russian led Collective Security Treaty Organization.
Implications and opportunities for the West.
Should another war over Nagorno-Karabagh prove imminent a number of opportunities may present themselves to the West in dealing its current problem numero uno, Iran:
1. Challenging the perception in the Muslim world that Iran is the new champion of Islam by hammering the fact that it is supporting (Christian) Armenia against (mostly Shia) Muslim Azerbaijan, thus shattering the image Tehran is trying to create as the global champion of Islam against the Zionist and Christian Crusaders. Actually Azerbaijan was briefly the world’s first Muslim republic between 1918 and 1920, before the Soviets took control, seeking access to Baku’s oil. Ironically Armenia claims to be the world’s first Christian state. Azerbaijan is a perfect candidate for a Western ally in the Muslim world. It remains largely secular, unafflicted by extremism (except a small but growing Salafist movement amongst Sunnis near the Dagestan border) and is even a prime example of religious tolerance. Baku has the largest Jewish synagogue in Europe, built there in 2003 and unlike Iran, Azerbaijan is proud of its Zoroastrian roots - the name Azerbaijan means Land of The Eternal Fire, a place where Zoroastrian fire temples flourished for thousands of years. In fact their main holiday is Novruz, from the Zoroastrian tradition.
2. Fermenting unrest in Northern Iran by turning the focus of Azeri nationalism towards South Azerbaijan - otherwise known is northwestern Iran. As much as the US wants the Caucasus stable (and Caspian oil flowing westward) if that is not achievable than the it is in its interest to have Iran destabilised and the Iranians know it. A possibility to explore is the brokering of a deal which would allow Nagorno-Karabagh independence in return for full US support for Azeri interests in Iran, perhaps even floating the idea of the formation of a Greater Azerbaijan. Iran should be as worried about the Azeri state as Turkey is about an independent Kurdistan. If the answer to Iraq is Tehran, could this be an opportunity to give them a riddle of their own?
The situation in Georgia is another reason for the Azebaijan to seek closer ties with the US - Russia is ultimately seeking regime change in Tbilisi. Should Georgia turn into a Russian outpost, like Armenia, it will next turn its focus on Azerbaijan, which would then be effectively cut off from the West. And Nagorno Karabakh would give it the perfect pretext to do so aggresively. Baku has been careful not to appear to be too close to any of the three courting powers. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has stated for example that Azerbaijan would never become a staging ground for a US attack on Iran, despite rumours to the contrary and current negotiations with the US about renovating an Azeri air base as a refueling station for NATO planes traveling to Afghanistan. He also declined a invitation from Moscow to join a Russian led “counterterrorism” navy group on the Caspian, CASFOR, but did stop by Moscow last week for a chat with Putin ahead of Azerbaijan’s upcoming negotiations with Gazprom, straight after visitting Brussels and signing an energy agreement with the European Union. And the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad met Aliyev in Baku on May 4th with the Iranians even announcing they are studying the possibility of transporting Iranian oil via the BTC pipeline. But Baku’s oil wealth is pegged to Western interests. Although fear of Iranian wrath from the south is a strong motivator in Baku, the Azeris know most of their prospects for growth lie eastward, with their friends in Turkey, in the EU, which is keen for Azeri gas, even in Israel, which gets 20% of its oil from Azerbaijan. This understanding should be further reinforced should Moscow’s stance towards Baku grow pushy or threatening.
3. Driving a wedge between Russia and Iran. Both are none too happy about Caspian oil flowing westward to Turkey, via Azerbaijan and Georgia, rather than north through Russia or south through Iran. Their clash of both economic and political interests here can be exploited. There is also a conflict of interest in Armenia. For example when the Iranians built a gas pipeline through Armenia Moscow demanded its diameter be limited to 700 millimeters, instead of the 1,420 millimeters in the original design, precluding the possibility of Iranian gas transitting to Georgia (or further to the Ukraine) via that line. Armenia promptly agreed. Russian state gas monopoly Gazprom pretty much owns Armenia’s gas distribution system. Another possible point of contention is Iran’s recent agreement with Georgia to supply it with energy. The EU is considering Iran as an option towards diversification away from overdependence on Russian gas. Yet another sign of possible tensions between Russia and Iran is the postponement last week of the Iranian Foreign Minister’s visit to Moscow, reportedly because of Iranian annoyance that the Russians said they may postpone the construction of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor. Yet despite all these conflicts of interest Moscow and Tehran appear tentatively in the process of becoming energy partners - a partnership in which Russia will no doubt come out dominant. Russia partners with Iran to counterbalance Western influence in their respective peripheries and because Iran keeps the US busy while Russia pursues its own political goals unhindered.
Currently there is talk in the US of making deals with Iran over Iraq. But Iran no longer backed by Russia would lose much of its clout so the saner option of negotiating with Russia should be explored. Besides support for Nagorno Karabkh and assurance of keeping Tehran’s influence out of the Caucasus and Central Asia perhaps Russian involvement in the development of the Kashagan oil field, estimated to be the world’s fourth largest, in the north of the Caspian Sea could be placed on the table.
Also see update, 11/16/06.
