June 14th, 2007

Southern Thailand insurgency: Increasing brutality and suspected foreign involvement should worry Australia.

South-East Asia security analyst Zachary Abuza has an op-ed piece in today’s SMH about the predominantly Indonesian terror group Jemaah Islamiah, prompted by the recent capture of it’s amir, Abu Dujana. In the final paragraph he mentions the escalating conflict in Southern Thailand, stating that although JI have not been actively involved in that confict, “it will be drawn in” and that Indonesians have increasingly been arrested in the zone. There are also signs of influence from further abroad. Due to recent developments there and the huge number of Australian tourists that visit Thailand, this issue could soon become of primary importance for Australia. Here’s a summary of the situation and developments this year in particular, also from Zachary Abuza, written for the Jamestown Foundation:

The first five months of 2007 have seen a dramatic increase in both the lethality and brutality of the Thai insurgency, prompting numerous Thai military officials to suspect the growing presence of foreign trainers. The arrest of an Indonesian on May 19 further raised suspicions. Nevertheless, Thai political leaders, including former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, head of the National Reconciliation Commission Khun Anand Panyarachun and current Prime Minister General Surayud Chulanont, along with the diplomatic community, have all insisted that the insurgency is a purely domestic affair with no foreign linkages. This view is being challenged by a growing body of evidence that shows that Thai officials have begun to speak more openly about the influence of foreigners on the Thai insurgents.

After three years of insurgency that has left some 2,200 people dead, militants have dramatically increased the tempo of attacks in 2007. The insurgents are clearly buoyed by their own successes, as well as the lackluster performance of the Thai security services. Moreover, the attacks this year have been far more provocative in various ways. At the political level, there have been three attacks on the Thai royal family or their entourage. At a more local level, beheadings, machete attacks and desecration of corpses have become more frequent. There have been 10 beheadings in 2007, one-third of the total number. Nearly as many people have been killed by machete attacks or have been bludgeoned to death. In dozens of cases, the bodies have been set on fire, and in one instance a female victim was burnt alive.

Targeting has also been more brutal—women, children and monks, people who would never have been targeted in earlier iterations of the Thai insurgency, are now systematically gunned down. In a shocking case that occurred in mid-March and was reminiscent of the carnage of Algeria or Kashmir, a minivan was disabled by an IED and all 10 passengers, including three women and a girl, were shot execution style (Terrorism Focus, April 24). IEDs have also grown in size and complexity. It took insurgents almost two years to develop IEDs larger than five kilograms. This year has already witnessed 15 and 20 kilogram devices used several times a week, causing much higher casualty rates, especially among police and soldiers. Many of the devices are similar to the one found and defused on May 28: a 20 kilogram ammonium nitrate bomb constructed in a fire extinguisher, stuffed with bolts, nuts and pieces of rebar and hidden on the side of the road awaiting an army convoy (Bernama, May 28). The bomb was command detonated, but cell phone detonators are still currently used. Casio watches, which have been used routinely in Iraq, are now also regularly employed in southern Thailand.

There is a possibility that exogenous factors are at play.

[..]

Thai military intelligence officials interviewed by this author believe that there are Middle Eastern trainers involved in the insurgency, based on the fact that the IED technology has improved so rapidly. They tend to dismiss the notion that such technology was available through the internet.
[..]
The veteran Middle East journalist Amir Taheri wrote in a March 2006 article in Asharq al-Awsat that “international jihadist circles” on the internet and across the Muslim world were discussing the possibility of waging a broader jihad in southern Thailand. He stated, “The buzz in Islamist circles is that well-funded jihadist organizations may be preparing a takeover bid for the southern Thailand insurgency.” There exists a potential for bleed-out from Iraq. As the Thai insurgency drags on (and it shows no signs of slowing), its profile will be raised in the consciousness of Muslims around the world, and it may attract more attention and funding.

Note that the dramatic increase in violence pretty much started since the coup last September, when the Thai military disposed of then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, after a very brief wait-and-see-who’s-in-change lull. Thaksin favoured a tough approach against the insurgents, while the leader of the junta that took power, Army Commander General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, who is a Muslim, favoured negotiations, but claimed he can’t find anyone to negotiate with. General Sonthi’s soft approach has clearly been at least in part responsible for the emboldened mood of the insurgents.

The conflict zone is but a couple of hours drive away from major tourists spots, frequented by many thousands of Australians every year. It is growing in brutality, the sophistication and boldness of the attacks is increasing, as is the range of tactics used. If Middle East terror groups (and even JI) get involved, if they are not already, it is only a matter of time before Thailand begins to see suicide attacks. And it can already only be a matter of time before tourists become targets, most likely after the Thai army changes to a tougher approach (there are signs that they already are). It is not a remote possibility that the next attack that kills Australians on the scale of Bali will be in Thailand. Security in the tourists areas is relatively weak, the current government has been unable to effective consolidate power after the coup and remains unstable, with continuous rumours of another coup being in the works in Bangkok, as the junta is in serious disagreement with the interim Prime Minister. As the government and military continue to be preoccupied with their power plays, the potential for an international disaster in the South is growing and Australia should be taking note. This will not remain a domestic Thai issue for much longer, despite wishful thinking and reassuring words from Bangkok.

June 9th, 2007

The radicalization of Mohammad Sidique Khan, mastermind of 7/7.

Shiv Malik went into the Beeston ghetto in Leeds to do research for a BBC documentary on the lives of the four 7/7 bombers, 3 of whom were from Beeston. What he found was a self-isolated Pakistani community in which a large proportion of the secondg eneration, having become alienated from the traditionalism of their parents, but unable to integrate into British society, found a spiritual home in the transnational Islamist movement of the Salafi-Jihadists.

After months of digging around and still unable to find anyone willing to honestly talk to him Shiv found out about Khan’s cabbie brother and took a couple of cab rides with him. Then finally more information was forthcoming from other sources and Shiv was able to piece together the story of Khan’s gradual radicalisation that finally led him to become a suicide bomber.

Serious problems started in Beeston some ten year ago, when the whole neighbourhood became increasingly infested with drugs. The community did not know how to deal with it. Then a group of second-generation Pakistanis emerged, known as the Mullah boys, who became a vigilante community work squad. They would forcibly take drug-addicted Pakistani youths off the street and detox them. Mohammad Sidique Khan was a part of this group and was looked up to in the community. But as the group’s religiousity increased so did their militancy. Meanwhile Khan came into conflict with his family over his Salafism and his choice of girlfriend, who was from a different sect (she was Deobandi, which is similar to Wahhabism, while his family was Berelvi, which is a type of Sufism). Read the rest of this disturbing story here.

You probably won’t be surprised to know, by the way, the documentary was never made. The BBC deemed the script to be too “Anti-Muslim”. Reality has become too anti-Muslim to talk about in Britain.

One other random fact that jumped out at me in the article:

Among those who study British race relations, there’s an informal theory that states that 30 years after the establishment of any sizeable ethnic minority community, there will be riots.

I wonder how the theory translates to other countries? The last 10 years has seen a level of migration all over the world unprecedented in human history, particularly into the First World. And 20-30 years from now will coincide with the West’s catastrophic demographic slump, which is likely to decimate a number of Western economies. I think Europe in particular is going to be seeing bigger trouble than just riots.

June 9th, 2007

Requirements.

One of Moscow’s trendiest nightclubs recently hosted a night called “Marry a Millionaire”, which is your night of nights if you’re hip young (preferably very young) Russian “millionaire hunter”. You will probably also enjoy the event if you’re seedy cashed-up mafia boss with a taste for women half, a third or perhaps a quarter your age.

The article is a quote goldmine, but this would have to be the money shot:

“He should be smart, really handsome, tall, with a really good body, like some kind of prince. Black hair, really green eyes. He should have around $US45 million.”

Those are the words of “Vikki Kurova, 17, who drives a Porsche and whose father is in the steel business”.

The steel business? Perhaps something was lost in translation, but most Russian Porsche owners are in the “stealing business”. Perhaps for her 18th birthday Vicki could ask daddy to tell her what he really does. Wait a minute. Whats a 17 year old doing in a nightclub anyway? You’ve got to love that good old Russian sense of irony – nightclub “face control” involves looking at everything but. Especially the one on the ID card.

But lets hear a bit more Vikki wisdom:

“I spend a lot of money – in a week $US300 or $US400. I couldn’t marry a guy that’s not rich because I want to live like I live now,”

Wow, that is a lot of money, Vikki. And thinking ahead to when daddy is in jail. Good girl!

Great to see a girl who knows what she wants. But does Vicki know what her hazel-eyed prince charming may be looking for in her?

“If you want to be a millionaire’s wife, you should be young, and of course beautiful. All millionaires love young girls.”

And what do those millionaires do when those young, beautiful girls get old, Vicki? I should mention there’s a big difference between the Russian and Australian definition of “old”. Like, about a 30 year difference.

But things always balance out in this world, so for every airhead bimbo seeking a prince there’s an airhead princess out there scrubbing’s someone’s floor for attention (ok, perhaps its not exactly a one to one ratio):

Although Diana’s life was been covered in excruciating detail, [..] Brown provides details of Diana’s detachment from reality, such as telling Brown over a lunch that she thought she could solve the conflict in Northern Ireland.

“I’m very good at sorting out people’s heads,” Brown quotes her as saying.

[..]“Marks and Spencer have got these very clever little meals that you just put the timer on and press the button and it’s done for you!” Diana is quoted as telling her therapist, Simone Simmons.

[..] She would also spend the day at [her Pakistani heart surgeon boyfriend Hasnat Khan's messy one-bedroom apartment in Chelsea, where she would vacuum, do the dishes and iron his shirts.

Alas, contrary to popular belief (in Russia, anyway) being Royalty doesn't get you everything:

[..] but her efforts were in vain. Dr Khan’s mother had no intention of letting her son marry anyone other than a Pakistani Muslim girl.

Well, I suppose its nice to know at least someone in this world still listens to their mother.

millionaire.jpg

June 8th, 2007

Female genital mutilation: An Islamic practice.

This post is a reply to a guest post over at Pommygranate’s blog, by Kizzie, a Sudanese Muslim woman, who currently resides in Cairo. In her post Kizzie tries to show that Female Genital Mutilation is not an Islamic practice, but rather a cultural one, partly basing her argument on the premise that the two are mutually exclusive. However, although FGM is a certainly a cultural practice that predates Islam, it is also an Islamic practice, which is what I am going to show below.

The reason that a Sudanese Muslim woman came to be guest-blogging on Pommygranate’s site, by the way, is the debate that has raged this week across the Australian blogosphere in the wake of Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s visit here last week. Ironically Ali barely mentioned FGM when she spoke on Sunday night.
The first bone in the debate was thrown by Kim at Larvatus Prodeo. Tim Blair then pulled her up on her smug insensitivity , while in the meantime the fireworks really started flying in the comments to Kim’s post. Blair followed up and Kim attempted to fire back, only to get blasted to pieces by Blair (see the Update in last TB link). Far back along the way FGM became the focus of the debate, as it rippled out through the blogosphere and finally here we are. Phew.

Now to answering Kizzie’s post. She starts off explaining where FGM is practiced (many African countries and some Arab countries in the Middle East, like, you may be surprised to learn, in Kurdistan, where most women are “circumcised”) and describes the four classifications of FGM, which disfigure the female genitalia to various degrees. No argument so far. Except the part where she uses the term Female Genital Circumcision, but than refers to it as FGM thereafter, which actually stands for Female Genital Mutilation. A telling manifestation of double-think right there, I’d say.

Kizzie’s argument is divided into two parts and in the first she attempts to argue that FGM is not an Islamic practice, giving three arguments to support her view. Looking at them one by one:

1. FGM predates both Christianity and Islam since it is believed to date back to time of the Pharaohs.

Well, noone is going to argue with that. A lot of Islamic practices predate Islam, and some predate Christianity also. Thats hardly an argument that all those practices are not Islamic. The Islamic practice of not eating pork was a Judaic one before Islam, the Islamic practice of five prayers a day was practices by Zoroastrians before Islam, the Islamic symbol of star and crescent was a symbol of a number of Moon-Gods before Islam, and so on and so forth. The covering of the female body, polygamy, the washing of extremities before prayer and meals, fasting, all these have been cultural practices somewhere before becoming Islamic ones.
Here’s how Sheikh Muhammad Al-Mussayar from Al-Azhar University put it (full quote and source further down):

”Female circumcision is no less valid just because it was practiced in Pharaonic times and in the Jahiliya. Islam accepted some customs, which were harmonious with human nature, and rejected others, which contradicted human nature.”

Anyway, what is important is how a person justifies their actions – is it because “thats just how we do things round here” (ie. a cultural practice, like shaking hands in the West or rubbing noses amongst the Eskimos), or is it because the practice is made compulsory or recommended by their religious belief system? I’ll get to the Islamic justifications (and recommendations) for FGM shortly.

2. FGM is found in non-Muslim societies example: Christians in Ghana and other non-Muslim societies in India and South America.

See my answer to one. If every Islamic practice was disowned because it was practiced by adherents of other religions there wouldn’t be much left thats Islamic. The question is does Islam give justification for the practice? When I get to the scriptural and scholarly references below it should be clear that it does. The distinction of Islam being a “complete way of life”, rather than merely a religion, as Muslims like to point out, gives extra weight to this argument, as virtually any act can be determined to be allowed, disallowed, recommended etc from the Sunnah (the tradition and example of the Prophet and his companions as recorded in the Hadiths). For the Islamic Ummah the lines between culture and religion are virtually non-existent, with an overriding Islamic culture superseding any local one. Anyhow, are there any Christian priests in Ghana giving religious justification for FGM or does it exist despite the opposition of the Church? Because there most certainly are plenty of Muslim Sheikhs giving religious justification for FGM.

3. If FGM was obligatory in Islam then Muslim scholars from all over the world wouldn’t be working together to ban its practice.

Here Kizzie tries to confuse the issue by using the word “obligatory”. FGM is certainly “obligatory” in most schools of Islam. In most schools it is seen as “noble”, “honorable” and “recommended”, but not obligatory. The distinction is much the same as that between the wearing of the hijab and the wearing of the niqab (which covers the face) in most Islamic schools. The niqab is deemed obligatory only in the more severe Islamic schools (the Wahhabi, Deobandi etc), by others it is viewed as kind “going the extra mile” to please Allah, a noble act of piety. Is wearing the niqab not an Islamic practice because most schools do not deem it “obligatory”?

Anyhow, Kizzie sites three example here, two of conferences and one of a “meeting” of Muslim scholars where FGM was denounced. Note that all three events are from the last 2 years. One conference was organized by a German human rights group and held in Cairo and involved scholars from Al-Azhar. The “meeting” was also held in Cairo’s Al Azhar university. The other conference was held in Nigeria and news reports again feature quotes from scholars from Al Azhar, which is the foremost Sunni institution in the world, so certainly has authority. It does appear that the issue has been seriously debated at Al-Azhar (links below). I do wonder though whether these denouncement draw a distinction between “female circumcision” and FGM, by which some Muslims only refer to infibulation.

I also wonder why it took 14 centuries for these denouncements to come out. Where are the Fatwas banning the practice, other than those against Infibulation, the most severe of the four forms, prior to the the 21st century? Why did the scholars not try to rid of the Islamic world of this barbaric practice before Western influence shamed them into doing so? Why was a German human rights group needed to start the conference in the first place?

As for “Muslim scholars from all over the world [..] working together to ban its practice” (I am only seeing scholars from Al-Azhar), well, what about all the Muslim scholars all over the world encouraging it and using the Sunnah to justify it? They certainly seem to have the superior numbers.

Before I start quoting some of these scholars, here are some quotations from the Hadiths that are commonly used to justify the practice:

Although there is no mention of it in the Quran itself, there are several hadiths, where Female Genital Mutilation is encouraged by Mohammad.

The first hadith is from Abu Dawud (Book 41, Number 5251): Um ‘Atiyyah is reported as an exciser of female slaves who had immigrated with Mohammad.
On one occasion Mohammad allegedly asked her if she kept practicing her profession, to which she responded in the affirmative. Then she added: “unless it is forbidden and you order me to stop doing it.” Mohammad replied: “yes, it is allowed.”
Mohammad then gave Um ‘Atiyyah specific instructions on the methodology for female circumcision (Aldeeb, 1994, p. 6), explaining to her that his method of “female circumcision” would bring radiance to the face of the woman.
This hadith is also quoted by al-Hakim and al-Baihaqi on the authority of al-Dhaahhak ibn Qais (al-Sabbagh, 1998, p. 17).

Another well-known hadith is that of Ahmad ibn Hanbal. He relates in his Musnad (5:75) from Abu al-Malih ibn, Usama’s father, that Mohammad said:
“Circumcision is sunna (tradition) for men and an honorable quality for women”

A third hadith states: “If the two circumcision organs (khitanan) meet, ritual ablution (gusl), becomes obligatory.” This is cited in Malik, Muslim, al-Tirmithi and Ibn Majah in their respective hadith collections and can also be found in other collections (al-Sabbagh, 1998, p. 38).

There are many documented justifications by Islamic scholars through the ages, based on these Hadiths. And many of them, coincidentally, are from the same aforementioned Al-Azhar university. Possibly because Egypt is pretty much FGM-central, with 97% of women there having been subjected to it. You’d think if the practice contradicted Sharia it would have become less prevalent, if not stamped out by now. Islamic countries don’t seem to have much trouble minimising alcohol consumption, for example. Anyway, lets hear from the Sheikhs:

In Reliance of the Traveler, a classical manual of Islamic law, endorsed by Al-Azhar in 1991 as conforming ‘to the practice and faith of the orthodox Sunni community,’ we find the following, with notes from several scholars and the translator:

e4.3 Circumcision is obligatory (commentary of Sheikh ‘Umar Barakat: “for both men and women”). For men it consists of removing the prepuce from the penis, and for women, removing the prepuce (Arabic: Bazr) of the clitoris (remark by the translator: “not the clitoris itself, as some mistakenly assert”). (comment by Sheikh ‘Abd al-Wakil Durubi: Hanbalis hold that circumcision of women is not obligatory but sunna, while Hanafis consider it a mere courtesy to the husband.)”

A look at the original Arabic show the text to actually say:

Circumcision is obligatory (for every male and female)
by cutting off the piece of skin on the glans of the penis of the male,
but circumcision of the female is by cutting out the clitoris
(this is called HufaaD).

Further commentary (from a non-Muslim):

The deceptive translation by Nuh Hah Mim Keller, made for Western consumption, obscures the Shafi’i law, given by ‘Umdat al-Salik, that circumcision of girls by excision of the clitoris is mandatory. This particular form of female circumcision is widely practiced in Egypt, where the Shafi’i school of Sunni law is followed.

Some years ago Pamela Bone asked Sheik Fehmi al-Imam of the Preston Mosque about FGM and his reply was “You probably don’t need it but women in hot countries do”. (The Age, 21/7/01 p7) (same link)

In 1981 the Great Sheikh of the same aforementioned Al-Azhar University “stated that parents must follow the lessons of Mohammed and not listen to medical authorities because the latter often change their minds. Parents must do their duty and have their daughters circumcised.”. (same link)

How things have changed after 20 years of Western influence!

Again from the same link:

Sheikh Yussef Al-Qaradhawi, one of Sunni Islam’s most influential clerics and a spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood favors partial circumcision for women as a moderate, just, and reasonable solution best suited to reality. In a Fatwa on this issue, he wrote, “Anyone who thinks that circumcision is the best way to protect his daughters should do it. I support this, particularly in the period in which we live.”

And still more the learned men of Al-Azhar:

On 12/2/2007 Al-Arabiya TV aired ‘Al-Azhar University Scholars Argue over the Legitimacy of Female Circumcision Practiced in Egypt.’ The debate was between Egyptian Al-Azhar University scholars Sheikh Muhammad Al-Mussayar and Sheikh Mahmoud Ashur.

Muhammad Al-Mussayar: notes “All the jurisprudents, since the advent of Islam and for 14 centuries or more, are in consensus that female circumcision is permitted by Islam. But they were divided with regard to its status in shari’a. Some said that female circumcision is required by shari’a, just like male circumcision. Some said this is the mainstream practice, while others said it is a noble act. But throughout the history of Islam, nobody has ever said that performing female circumcision is a crime. There has been a religious ruling on this for 14 centuries.” “First of all, there are reliable hadiths in Al-Bukhari and Al-Muslim which support female circumcision. The Prophet Muhammad said: ‘If a circumcised woman and man have intercourse, they must undergo ablution.’ Unreliable hadiths do not cancel out the reliable ones. We have unreliable hadiths regarding prayer, fasting, charity, and pilgrimage. Should we abolish prayer and charity just because some hadiths are unreliable?..”Female circumcision is no less valid just because it was practiced in Pharaonic times and in the Jahiliya. Islam accepted some customs, which were harmonious with human nature, and rejected others, which contradicted human nature.” (reported by MEMRI.org 27/2/2007 and http://fgmnetwork.org) (same link)

So for 1400 years the scholars have been divided on whether it is an obligation (the Shafi’i school), sunna (the Hanbali school) or a “noble act”, an “honorable quality”, while in the Hanafi school it is apparently “a mere courtesy to the husband”. All a sudden in the last 3 years the final word comes out declaring the the practice neither obligatory or sunna, but suddenly Unislamic? Give me a break.

For more evidence still, see also this fascinating and shocking recent debate (and it is at least good to see they have plenty of those) involving a male lecturer from, once again, Al-Azhar university, debating a female lecturer (not sure from which institution) on the subject of FGM. The male sheikh again argues that milder forms of FGM are sunna, while total removal of the clitoris is forbidden, while the female lecturer argues against all forms of FGM. Dr. Muhammad Wahdan concludes:

In Egypt we have four and a half million spinsters. The definition of a spinster is a woman who has reached 30, without ever receiving a marriage proposal. We have a spinster problem in the Arab world, and the last thing we want is for them to be sexually aroused. Circumcision of the girls who need it makes them chaste, dignified, and pure.

But back to Kizzie’s post, and in part two of her essay, having apparently show FGM is not an Islamic practice, she tries to show that FGM is actually a social/cultural practice. Firstly Kizzie states that the less severe forms are practiced in Indonesia. I would have thought that only goes to prove my point? Then she goes on to point out some age-old cultural justifications for the ancient FGM tradition in Africa, which only serves to moot the waters, as ancient cultural reasoning does not trump modern Islamic reasoning, so I’ll simply leave that part alone. But as Indonesia has been brought up, I will follow up with that example. It is true that the type of FGM practiced in Indonesia is almost always not as severe as that of North Africa. And here I can agree that we are seeing “cultural differences”. FGM is a part of Islamic culture, it is an Islamic practice, which came to Indonesia with Islam and did not exist there prior. However the differences between how it is done there as opposed to say Egypt, can be put down to “cultural practice”. Lets not be confused by that distinction, however.

Here are some extracts from an article that appeared in The Age, in 2004 about FGM in Indonesia:

The practice of female circumcision in Indonesia has moved into hospitals. Greater genital mutilation is the likely result. Matthew Moore and Karuni Rompies report.

Hospitals across Indonesia are offering new parents a one-price surgical package for their just-born girls — as well as piercing their ears, they’ll circumcise them.

At Jakarta’s Hermina Hospital the price for the two procedures is 95,000 rupiah (about $A16), at IDI hospital in Surabaya in East Java it’s only 15,000 rupiah, while in Makassar’s Khadijah Hospital in Sulawesi, hospital staff quote 25,000 to 30,000 rupiah.

[..] While hospitals might be more hygienic, health care experts are worried by strong evidence that the move has led to more of the child’s genital tissue being cut because medical practitioners use different implements and techniques.

Village-based midwives and traditional healers have been circumcising girls in Indonesia for centuries, although the extent and details of the practice are only now emerging.

[..]

In an attempt to find out more about female circumcision, the US AID-funded study by the Population Council surveyed 1694 households in eight separate regions and found all the boys and 97.5 per cent of girls had been circumcised.

[..]

The concern now relates to changes due to circumcisions in hospitals, where health care professionals use scissors in more than 75 per cent of cases, which invariably means cutting flesh.

[..]
It’s not only babies who are circumcised, with one-third of those surveyed circumcised between the ages of five and nine, and some even older.

Several hours out of Jakarta in Bandung, the Assalaam Foundation has been holding free mass circumcisions for males and females for almost 50 years, with as many as 400 people turning up at a time. Syarief Hamid, treasurer with the foundation, which runs several schools, said the circumcisions were timed to honor the Prophet’s birthday, and were growing in popularity each year.

While religion is the main reason for circumcising girls, he says there are also health reasons. “I understand that a girl who is not circumcised would not have clean genitals after she urinates and sometimes that can cause cervical cancer,” he says. “The religious view is, if you are not circumcised you won’t have clean genitals after urinating. If then you pray, your prayer won’t be legal.”

[..]

Religion was the reason cited by 55 per cent of mothers surveyed for circumcising their daughters, although none could identify parts of the Koran or the Prophet Muhammad’s guidance, called Hadith, where it is stipulated. While 32 per cent nominated health and hygiene as the perceived benefit, 9 per cent said they did not know what benefit it would bring.

Masitoh Chusnan, from the women’s wing of Muhammadiyah, one of Indonesia’s two biggest Muslim organizations, says circumcision of girls is regarded in Islam as an honorable practice.

“The Hadith did not say it’s obligatory, but it is recommended to have it done,” she says. “There is the Prophet’s words saying girls must be circumcised, but you should not cut too much.”

[..] current practice shows no signs of a decline in popularity, with more than 90 per cent of mothers questioned supporting the practice continuing.

And one in five mothers even suggested social sanctions should be imposed on girls who were uncircumcised.

The above dove-tails perfectly with what the religious arguments above – it is not an obligation, but an “honourable practice”. But far disturbing still are stories about the hundreds, if not thousands of Christian women from Indonesia’s Molucca Islands who were forcibly converted to Islam and in the process forcibly circumcised:

Christian woman recalls horror of forced conversion to Islam

Posted on May 1, 2001 | by Brittany Jarvis

AMBON, Indonesia (BP)–”My scar healed quite fast, but the sad, humiliated feeling stayed. I feel like I’m no longer complete, both as a person and a woman.”

That is the testimony of Christina Sagat, a 32-year-old Christian from Kasiui, Indonesia, who was forcibly circumcised by her Muslim neighbors. Unfortunately, as traumatic as her story sounds, hundreds of women have endured similar oppression.

“My niece, Cecilia, who at that time was eight months pregnant, was also circumcised,” Sagat said. “My mother, who was in her 70s, was also circumcised. Teenagers, and even infants, were circumcised. I don’t understand these people.”

[..]

More details on whats been happening on Ambon Island and other Molucca Islands, where thousands of people have been killed, and hundreds of thousands displaced here. Hundreds of Christian families have been given the choice – convert or die. The women and children are then separated from the men and “converted”. Men and children are circumcised using the same dirty razor blade and then told to go and wash in the sea to disinfect the heavily bleeding wounds. Many of the ‘holy warriors’ perpetrating these crimes are members of Laskar Jihad, a Salafi-Jihadist group whose leader studied in Pakistan and considers himself more “fundamentalist” than Osama bin Laden, who he says is ignorant of true Islam. That doesn’t seem to stop his followers from wearing Osama t-shirts though. Laskar Jihad has between 3000 and 10000 fighters, who have been receiving training and assistance from the Indonesian Army. Strange that having studying in some madrassah in Pakistan this douche-bag has decided that circumcising women should go hand-in-hand with their conversion to Islam. This may be a somewhat extreme example, but it goes to show that there is at least a significant number of Muslims, even in Pakistan and Indonesia, who believe in the religious justification for FGM as a very Islamic practice indeed.

Kizzie says resents that when a Muslim kills a Christian man, in a post-9/11 world, his religion is invariably mentioned, whereas when, say, a Christian kills a Christian religion is not mentioned. Well, Kizzie, in a post-9/11 world Westerners have begun to take greater note of the fact that many Muslims use religion as justification for murder. Perhaps if the common occurence was that a Muslim and a Christian fought to the death over a donkey in the marketplace there would be no need to mention religion. However when the Muslim shouts ‘God is Great!’ in the act of murder and kills in the process of waging Jihad on the Kuffar, there most certainly is reason to mention his religion, because clearly religion was at least in part a motivating factor. Likewise when a child’s sexual organs are disfigured because it is supposed to be a “noble” act in the eyes of Allah, you bet we are going to take notice of the religious motivation behind the act. Because take away the religious justification, without a doubt the incidence of the practice would decrease and be easier to eradicate, when only the cultural motivations are left, no longer multiplied by the powerful force of religiosity.

Kizzie concludes by voicing her resentment that FGM has begun to be viewed in a religious rather than a cultural context and continues to assert the mutual exclusivity between the description of the practice of FGM as either cultural or religious. But clearly, as shown above, it is a cultural practice, that many Muslims view as religious and observe for religious reasons, thus it is a religious Islamic practice also. There is clear justification for that viewpoint in Islamic scripture, with there merely being a disagreement between various schools and scholars on whether the practice is obligatory or merely a “noble” or “honorable” act. And only in recent years certain Islamic scholars, mainly from Egypt, have began voicing an opinion that all forms of FGM are haram, ie forbidden, but this view goes against 1400 years of Islamic jurisprudence.

Ultimately, according to some Islamic schools FGM is obligatory (a minority position), and according to most others it is “noble”/”honourable” or sunna (tradition), which clearly serves as a powerful motivator based on religion. In both cases it can thus be described as an Islamic practice and will continue to be so until Muslims stop practicing it, Skeikhs stop using the Sunnah to justify it and its practitioners stop citing the Islamic religion as a motivating factor.

UPDATE (10/6): Kizzie has posted a reply. Not much there I disagree with, really, and don’t have time to comment further just now. Perhaps on Tuesday. Thank you for the debate, Kizzie.

June 7th, 2007

Don’t f**k with the Russians.

Stratfor reporting on the case of some Russian multinational employees that were kidnapped by Nigerian militants last week (subscription only), in hope of gaining a ransom payout:

The Russian Foreign Ministry summoned Nigeria’s ambassador June 4 to discuss the June 3 kidnapping of six Russian employees of giant Russian aluminum producer United Company RUSAL in the Niger Delta. Thus far, the many militant groups in the Delta region have shown no regard for country of origin when kidnapping foreign residents. But this is the first time Russians have been kidnapped in the Niger Delta, and Russia is not likely to respond as other countries have to this common militant practice.

[..]

Consistent with its past dealings with armed groups that kidnap Russians, someone in the employ of either the Kremlin or RUSAL will retaliate against the individuals who participated in the kidnapping — or, should the attackers be affiliated with some larger organization, against other individuals in the organization. In September 1985, Hezbollah militants abducted four employees of the Soviet Embassy in Beirut. The KGB’s response to the kidnapping was to carry out reprisal kidnappings of several family members of the suspected Lebanese abductors and to send them back home in pieces. A few days later, the Soviets were released — unlike U.S. hostages kidnapped in Lebanon, some of whom remained in captivity for years.

Whatever the Russian response to the Niger Delta kidnappings, the desired effect will be to deter future attacks against Russian businesses and citizens. And any reprisal likely will happen after RUSAL has paid for the safe release of its employees.

There’s a lesson in there somewhere for all of us.

June 6th, 2007

Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s lecture in Sydney.

Pommygranate has posted a fantastic report on Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s presentation at the Sydney Recital Hall last Sunday night. Inspirational stuff.

June 1st, 2007

Gadhafi’s Angels: The Green Nuns of the Revolution.

What on Earth am I on about? The “Green Nuns” is the name given to the 500-strong all female personal guard of Lybia’s megalomaniacal strongman Muammar Gadhafi, the “gift” upon the world that just keeps on giving. They are also known as “the Amazonian guard” and are an elite unit of Lybia’s Revolutionary Guards Corps.

Here are a few happy snaps:

green nun babe

green nuns
gadaffi

green nuns 1

green nuns2

green nuns3
They are supposedly all virgins, well at least until they enter into Gadhafi’s service, and are ever ready to die for their leader. More photos here.

A bit more trivia about everyone’s favourite cross-dressing ubermensch:

During a 1990 Arab summit in Cairo, soon after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Col. Gadhafi showed up escorted by a phalanx of sexy female bodyguards. He wore a single white glove on his right hand, which he said was to prevent him from “soiling his hands when forced to shake the hand of anyone who had exchanged a handshake with an Israeli.” It was a thinly covered insult directed at Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and any other Arab leaders who might have had diplomatic exchanges or meetings with Israel.

One of my personal favorite Gaddafisms was his recent declaration that North Africa is Shi’ite and that he is going to restore the 13th century (Ishmaili Shi’ite) Fatimid Empire there. You and what army? Oh.. that army.

May 31st, 2007

Iran and US find themselves on the same page on Iraq.

That page of course only has room for one… But thats later.

The geopolitical gurus at Stratfor make the following analysis of the ongoing negotiations between the US and Iran (subscription only):

Iran handed over a proposal to [U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan] Crocker during a brief encounter at the May 5-6 Sharm el-Sheikh summit in Egypt, but also chose to unofficially publicize its terms for Iraq through the Saudi-owned, British-based daily Al Hayat. The Iranian Foreign Ministry likely chose Al Hayat, a major Arab news outlet, to make a back-channel broadcast of what concessions it is prepared to make to allay Sunni concerns in the region.

In sum, this Iranian proposal called for a non-rushed withdrawal and relocation of U.S. troops to bases inside Iraq, a rejection of all attempts to partition Iraq, a commitment by the Sunni bloc to root out the jihadists and acknowledgement by Washington that the Iranian nuclear file cannot be uncoupled from the Iraq negotiations. In return, Iran would rein in the armed Shiite militias, revise the de-Baathification law and Iraqi Constitution to double Sunni political representation, create a policy to allow for the fair distribution of oil revenues (particularly to the Sunnis) and use its regional influence to quell crises in areas such as Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinian territories.

The terms put forth by the Iranians are so close to the U.S. position on Iraq that, with little exception, they could have been printed on State Department stationary and no one would have noticed the difference. If these are the terms Washington and Tehran are in fact discussing, then we are witnessing an extraordinary turn in the Iraq war in which the U.S. and Iranian blueprints for Iraq are finally aligning. It does not surprise us, then, that Crocker said after his meeting in Baghdad that the Iranian position “was very close to our own” at the level of policy and principle.

Extraordinary indeed. So is this finally a light at the end of tunnel? Maybe, except for a few small problems. Stratfor lists the problems as follows:

  • The transnational Sunni Jihadists with their dreams of an Islamic State of Iraq
  • the severely and perhaps irreconcilably split Iraqi Shia who are likely to a little rough on each other sooner rather than later
  • the much less splintered Iraqi Sunnis, who, although by and large online with these negotiations must be satisfied of their future safety and a slice of the pie in the Shia dominated Iraq (these guarantees are already part of the deal)
  • the Iraqi Kurds, who are the Iraqi faction that stands to lose most out of the above settlement and are not about to give up what they’ve worked so hard to finally achieve in Kurdistan
  • Ultraconservatives in Washington and Tehran who “can’t negotiate with those people”
  • Sunni Regional Powers with that whole Shia Crescent thing on their mind
  • Syria, who is feeling pretty important, if not immune right now while the Great Satan is all tied up elsewhere and they are useful to Iran
  • Russia, which has really been making the best of the US and Iranian preoccupation in Iraq and would be quite unhappy to have to start caring what the Americans (and even the much closer Iranians) think again

How is that light looking now?

May 31st, 2007

Germany: Are Turkish migrants’ cultural differences increasing with each generation?

The view of the article below is that they (ie the differences) are at least staying the same, saying that every generation of German Turks is like a first generation of migrants, especially as many Turks seek marriage partners in Turkey. But the rate of cultural change in Germany is different to that in Turkey and especially in rural Turkey, in Anatolia mentioned below, the conservative Muslim heartland of the country, which, if anything, is following the general trend in the Muslim world towards increased religious conservatism. Such a growing rift can only lead to one thing – an eventual split in the very identity of the host nation.

The extracts below are from a lengthy article, “Where Every Generation Is First-Generation”, in the NT Times, exploring some integration issues Germany is having with its huge Turkish population:

Exact statistics are hard to come by, but it is possible that as many as 50 percent of Turks (a word that in common parlance often includes even those with German citizenship) seek their spouses abroad, according to Schäuble, the interior minister. For most of the past decade, according to the ministry, between 21,000 and 27,000 people a year have successfully applied at German consulates in Turkey to form families in Germany. (Just under two-thirds of the newcomers are women.) That means roughly half a million spouses since the mid-1980s, which in turn means hundreds of thousands of new families in which the children’s first language is as likely to be Turkish as German.

Binational marriage alarms many Germans for two reasons. First, it allows the Turkish community to grow fast at a time when support for immigration is low. The Turkish population in Germany multiplies not once in a life cycle but twice — at childbirth and at marriage. Second, such marriages retard assimilation even for those Turks long established in Germany. You frequently hear stories from schoolteachers about a child of guest workers who was a star pupil three decades ago but whose own children, although born in Germany, struggle to learn German in grade school. After half a century of immigration, every new generation of Turks is still, to a large extent, a first generation.

Turkish marriages are seldom Western-style love matches. They are often arranged by parents. A 2003 study by the Federal Ministry of Family found that a quarter of Turkish women in Germany hadn’t even known their partners before they married. The rural Anatolian practice of marrying relatives, usually first cousins, is frequent. It accounts, according to the Center for Turkey Studies at the University of Duisburg-Essen, for between a sixth and a quarter of binational pairings. These marriages bring certain Anatolian problems into the heart of Germany. Domestic violence is high. The causes of wife-beating among families of immigrant background can be debated, but not the numbers. Gulgun Teyhani, who works at a battered-women’s shelter in Duisburg, reckoned that of the 86 women her house took in last year, 60 had a migrant background, and 51 of them spoke Turkish. Last year, the Federal Criminal Investigation Agency found that in the preceding five years, 45 “honor killings” were carried out by Turkish or Kurdish families in Germany against women deemed to have “strayed,” generally by dating Europeans or adopting Western fashions.

[..]
The tragedy of imported brides, Necla Kelek writes, is that they “will live in Germany but never arrive there.” Like Ates, Kelek is a Turkish-German woman with intense passions on either side of the hyphen. [..] It is in large part a result of her books that some Germans who once viewed Turkish marriage practices as none of their business now see it as a pressing crisis.

[..]
Like Ayaan Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands, Kelek has been accused of “Enlightenment fundamentalism,” a tendency to defend secular values too dogmatically. Last year, a group of 60 “migration researchers” wrote an open letter to the weekly paper Die Zeit attacking Kelek’s writing as “unserious” — an odd criticism to level at a memoirist, even one trained in sociology. Others say she has made Islam too central to her explanation of violence against women.

[..] In 2000, the German Youth Institute reported that 53 percent of Turkish women ages 16 to 29 would not consider marrying a German “under any circumstances.”

[..] In North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s most populous state and the one where Duisburg is located, 80 percent of Turks ages 25 to 34 are married; their average marriage age is 21 for women and 24 for men. Among non-Turks, only 32 percent of 25- to 34-year-olds are married; the average marriage age is 29 for women and 32 for men. Germans have one of the lowest fertility rates in the history of the world — 1.36 children per woman, according to 2004 figures. While it is hard to find precise figures for Turks in Germany, the rate is widely agreed to be higher.

[..] According to a study done by the Center for Turkey Studies in Essen, young Turkish women and men brought up in Germany view their fellow Turkish-Germans of the opposite sex as “distant from their own culture, or ‘degenerate.’ ”

[..] In the Comenius Garden in Neukolln, a particularly tough part of Berlin, Murat, Ali and Hakan, all in their late teens, were passing a freezing cold afternoon chatting and making up rap verses. Ali, whose family comes from the Black Sea port of Rize, is the son of a local Neukölln imam. He is training to be a plumber but is not employed yet. He is betrothed to a “friend” in Turkey. The person who introduced me to Ali said Ali’s other friends had spoken of the woman as his cousin. So I started by asking him why he had looked for his wife in Turkey. “German girls are Schlampen,” he replied. They’re sluts.

Necla Kelek is great, by the way, have a read of this article on Europe Multiculturalism and integration for a taste.

May 30th, 2007

Paul Berman: The Islamist, the Journalist and the defence of Liberalism.

Ayaan Hirsi Ali is in town and we have seen the predictable reaction from various representatives of the Muslim community. Yawn.

Whats more disconcerting is the criticism Hirsi Ali has received, particularly in Europe, from various intellectuals and philosophers, cultural relativists in-denial and morally obtuse apostles of the coming great Multiculturalist Utopia, some of whom had the gall to call her an “Enlightenment fundamentalist”. This attack on Hirsi Ali, and the accompanying championing of “moderate Islamist” Tariq Ramadan was the subject of a momentous debate I posted about earlier, which serves as the background for this post.

The cover story of the current issue of The New Statesman is called “Who’s afraid of Tariq Ramadan?” (and doesn’t Ramadan ever look the part of a modern philosopher?), by Paul Berman, and contains the most erudite, complete and clear defense of Ayaan Hirsi Ali against the lot above, yet. The whole essay is very long, broken up over 12 pages, so I recommend heading straight for the “print” version, which allows you to view it in one page. Feel free to search the page for “Ayaan” to get the relevant part (not that the whole thing is not worth reading, it is).

Here’s Berman’s explanation of why these people attack Hirsi Ali:

If you open either of her books and read a few lines at random, you will discover one reality that you would hardly guess from reading those attacks. Buruma–and he is not the only one to do this–presents Hirsi Ali as a diehard enemy of Islam, dedicated to hurling insults, which, to be sure, she does do, and with gusto. But this is not her major theme. In her books, and in the little film that she made with van Gogh, she dedicates herself mostly to something else, and that is to describe and to decry the miseries of women in the portion of the Muslim world that she knows best–in East Africa and Saudi Arabia, together with the immigrant zones of Europe. Her account of her own genital mutilation as a little girl, and of the botched genital mutilation of her sister, and the sister’s tragic life and suicide; her portrait of girlhood and marriage in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia, not to mention her own forced marriage, which she fled; the portrait of her grandmother, the Somali nomad, and the patriarchal customs of the past, which do seem to have lingered on; her sense of horror, as a girl, at seeing the women of Saudi Arabia for the first time, these women who have no faces because of their veils and whose black garments hang so shapelessly upon their bodies that, in order to know which way the women are facing, you have to look to see which way their shoes are pointing; her account of the shelters for abused Muslim women in Holland; her account of the terrors of refugee existence, and the double terrors of refugee existence for women–all these passages express something that can never be detected in a certain kind of high-minded cerebral journalism today. It is a visceral anger at oppression. A moral indignation, and not just a wistful pragmatism.

But mostly these passages in Hirsi Ali’s books raise the issue of women’s rights, and not from an outsider’s point of view, regardless of how many times she has been denounced for making herself an outsider to Muslim life. Hers is a story marked by knives–the knife at her own genital mutilation, and at her sister’s; the knife at the murder of her friend and colleague, pinning to his chest the sheet of paper threatening her own life. This is not a Swiss professor! Here is the actual insider; the real thing. I suppose that all this unironic indignation can only be annoying in the extreme to a certain kind of refined sensibility. Something about those knives takes away the quality of abstraction that allows a social issue to be shrugged off. It is always good to be subtle and nuanced, but Hirsi Ali’s writings have the effect of making a large number of nuanced subtleties look ridiculous.

About Hirsi Ali we do not have to wonder: where does she stand on the question of stoning women to death? Or on the obligation for husbands to beat their wives? Read one page by her and you will know the answer; and if you read two pages, you might begin to suspect that, on the television screens of France, the man who defended the oppressed of the oppressed in the poorest neighborhoods of Europe was Nicolas Sarkozy. But that has got to be the problem from a perspective like Buruma’s. This talk of women’s rights–doesn’t it point ultimately in directions that ought to be regarded as (here is the mystery of our present moment) conservative? Better the seventh century than Nicolas Sarkozy.

If there is an intellectual establishment, and I suppose there is, the attacks on Hirsi Ali radiate from its center. And this, the campaign against Hirsi Ali–this, like the anti-Semitic mob assault during the Paris peace march of 2003, or like the spectacle of millions of Britons marching under the leadership of an Islamist organization, or like the calm discussions in The New York Times of why it would be wrong to condemn with any vigor the stoning of women to death–this does represent something new. Here is the new development among journalists and intellectuals, the development that Ramadan’s career has served to illuminate. Something like a campaign against Hirsi Ali could never have taken place a few years ago. A sustained attack on an authentic liberal dissident crying out against injustices in remote parts of the world and even in the back streets of Western Europe, a sustained attack that appears nearly to have erased the very mention of women’s oppression and the struggle for women’s rights from discussion–no, this could not have happened yesterday, except on the extreme right. This is a new event. This is a reactionary turn in the intellectual world.

And delving deeper, past “the reactionary turn”, we happen upon a nose-dive:

[the French writer Pascal Bruckner] wrote a criticism of the leftist doctrine that in [the seventies] was still known as “Third Worldism”–meaning the hope and the expectation that, around the world, the impoverished countries, the former colonies and semi-colonies, would generate, as an aspect of their struggle against Western imperialism, a worldwide revolutionary alternative, a soulful new kind of socialism, a new and revolutionary culture. This was the doctrine that venerated revolutionary leaders such as Mao, Ho Chi Minh, and Fidel Castro not because they were communists but because they were the leaders of the Third World revolution.

But Bruckner, in writing about the “Third Worldist” idea, noticed that among the good-hearted leftists of the Western countries, sympathy for oppressed people in the former colonies had turned into a kind of dehumanizing contempt for the oppressed people in the former colonies, without anyone having noticed. He called his book The Tears of the White Man, and in its pages he served up a spectacular exposé of left-wing European clichés about the poor and the oppressed in faraway places–an enormous catalogue of Noble Savage imagery and other fantastical pictures of the superior qualities of downtrodden people in poor countries, compared with their former oppressors in Europe. The book was a demonstration of how, through a combination of guilty consciences and patronizing ignorance, the European intellectuals had ended up re-creating the worst sorts of racist and colonialist imaginings of what people in other places and with other skin tones must be like: their wisdom, virtue, selflessness, brilliance, and, above all, their profound quality of being different.

Bruckner has returned to this topic from time to time over the years, and just last year he came out with a sequel called La Tyrannie de la Pénitence, or The Tyranny of Penitence, updated to our own age, in which the “Third World” of yore has been renamed the “south,” and the imperialists have been renamed the forces of globalization. And the sequel has led Bruckner to take a new glance at how, in our own time, the progressive intellectuals of the Western countries, out of a continuing self-contempt and feeling of guilt for the Western crimes of the past, have likewise updated their fantasies about the wronged and inscrutable people of other regions without really changing them. Ian Buruma, because of his sundry books, was the ideal person for The New York Times Magazine to assign a profile on Tariq Ramadan; and Pascal Bruckner, because of his own books, has turned out to be the ideal person to write about Ian Buruma. Bruckner noted the peculiarities of Buruma’s campaign against Hirsi Ali. He took note of Timothy Garton Ash’s contribution to this campaign in The New York Review of Books. And Bruckner offered a philosophical analysis.

Buruma and Garton Ash, Bruckner concluded, had fallen for the intellectual miasmas of the postmodern sensibility, and the miasmas had led, via the errors of relativism and an indiscriminate multiculturalism, to the simplest of philosophical mistakes. This was the inability to draw even the most elementary of distinctions. In the postmodern idea, the Enlightenment has come to be looked upon as merely one more set of cultural prejudices, no better and very likely rather worse than other sets of cultural prejudices–a zealotry that is unable to control its own excesses. From this point of view, someone like Hirsi Ali, who grew up in an atmosphere of Islamist radicalism and the Muslim Brotherhood in Africa and has taken up a new outlook committed to rationalism and individual freedom, has merely gone from one fundamentalism to another–not much different, seen in this light, from van Gogh’s murderer.