The following is from a Jamestown Foundation paper “Iran’s Contribution to the Civil War in Iraq”, by Mounir Elkhamri, release in Jan, 2007:
Different Forms of the Iranian Presence in Iraq
In 2004, the assistant commander of the Iranian Republican Guard announced, during his visit to London, that Iran has two brigades and other militia in Iraq in order to protect the national security of Iran.
On March 11, 2004, Iranian intelligence opened an office in Najaf called “The Office to Help Poor Iraqi Shia.” Through that office, they were able to recruit over 70,000 Iraqis from the south to join one of the militias loyal to Iran. Every recruit would receive $2,000 in advance, then $1,000 a month—a princely sum in Iraq today.9
According to a defecting Iranian Republican Guard Council (IRGC) officer, “The scale and breadth of Qods Force operations in Iraq are far beyond what we did even during the war with Saddam.”10 The officer was referring to the IRGC’s extensive activities in Iraq during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. “Vast areas of Iraq are under the virtual control of the Qods Force through its Iraqi surrogates. It uses a vast array of charities, companies and other fronts to conduct its activities across Iraq.”11 He also stated, “We would send our officers into Iraq to operate for months under the cover of a construction company…Kawthar Company operated in Najaf last year to carry out construction work in the area around Imam Ali Shrine, but it was in fact a front company for the Qods Force. Qods officers, disguised as company employees, established contacts with Iraqi operatives and organized underground cells in southern Iraq.”12
Iran’s Ideological Control over Southern Iraq
In the past two years, Iran has sent more than 2,000 students and religious scholars to Najaf and Karbala. About one-third of them belong to Iranian intelligence. It has also assigned representatives in major Shia cities to provide financial support to Shia students and school instructors—$50 to $100 per student and $200 to $500 per instructor. Iran has sent several Iraqi political figures who were living in Iran back to Iraq to infiltrate and obtain sensitive political positions in the new Iraqi government. Iran considers these figures a solid foundation in the process of incorporating Iraq, without its northern area of Kurdistan, the moment the coalition forces start leaving Iraq.13
Iran has a strong presence in the southern provinces of Iraq and a secret one in Baghdad. Iran also has a respectable presence in the north of Iraq where it is utilizing Iranian Kurds, Iranian communists, Iranian- Kurdish student exchanges and Iranian agents. There were numerous agreements between the Iraqi-Kurdish leaders and Iran prior to the coalition’s invasion of Iraq.
In one of the agreements, Iran agreed not to intervene in Kurdistan’s internal affairs or to go after the Iranian-Kurds who live in Kurdistan and are anti-Iran. In exchange, the Kurdistan government agreed to not allow any attacks on Iran from Kurdistan.14
Assassination of Scientists, Professors, Officers and Key Sunni Figures
After the fall of the regime, Iraqi citizens began to witness numerous assassinations and kidnapping attempts that targeted Sunni professors, scholars, doctors and especially those army officers and air force pilots that participated in the Iraq-Iran war. According to an ex-Iraqi Air Force pilot who is currently serving in the new Iraqi army, when the coalition forces were busy fighting the insurgency and preparing for the first national election, the Iranian militias were busy assassinating over 90 air force pilots and other high ranking military officers that had participated in the Iraq-Iran war.15
In late 2005, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani condemned the assassinations and kidnapping attempts and sent an invitation to the rest of the former Iraqi Air Force pilots and high ranking officers to move to Sulaymania or Irbil in Kurdistan if they did not feel safe where they lived.
Iran’s Control of Southern Iraq
According to an Iraqi officer, during al-Jaafari’s administration numerous members of the Iranian intelligence were naturalized in Iraq and thousands of hectares were distributed in Shia cities such as Basra, Najaf and Karbala. In 2004, al-Alkeed Ghazi, an Arab-Shia naturalization officer, was assassinated because he refused to naturalize anyone that belonged to a militia. Iran also sent Iranian investors along with its intelligence officers in order to buy as many as 5,000 apartments, houses, stores and restaurants in Baghdad, Basra, Najaf and Karbala. These are used as living quarters and command centers for the Iranian agents and the other militia loyal to Iran.
These ongoing efforts are mainly to guarantee a successful vote for federalism in the south of Iraq. Similar scenarios were witnessed in the north of Iraq before the first and the second national elections, where a large number of Kurdish families relocated from Kurdistan to a different area north of Iraq—Mosul, Tal Afar, Rabia and others—in order to secure enough votes for the new Iraqi constitution and the national election.
Iranian Involvement in Iraq’s Election and its Aftermath
Prior to the 2005 Iraqi national election, Iran sent a large number of its agents as visitors to Shia shrines in order to influence and secure the necessary votes for the Shia party running in that election. They smuggled in thousands of Iranian-made pictures, flyers and already filled-out voting ballots in order to support their Shia candidates. The Shia United Iraqi Alliance consisted of 18 conservative Shia Islamist groups such as: the Dawa party, led by ex-Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari; the pro-Iranian Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, led by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim; the Iraqi Nationalist Sadr Movement, loyal to populist Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr; and others.16 [..]
Federalism
On July 31, 2006, Adel Abd al-Mahdi, a senior official in SCIRI and Iraq’s vice president, pledged that the Shia Iraqi coalition—the biggest bloc in the Iraqi parliament—would raise the issue of a Shia federal state in the coming month. A few days before that announcement, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, chairman of SCIRI, repeated his call for a Shia federal region.18
The chairman of SCIRI also stated, “Federalism is constitutionally secured. We have to work seriously on this issue, and figure out the necessary mechanism to switch to federalism. Dear countrymen, this issue is important to your governorates’ security, safety and reconstruction.”19 [..]
Iraqi federalism is an important issue for Iran. When the Shia in the south of Iraq, who are loyal to Iran, claim their independence in Iraq’s southern provinces, they will control the second largest oil reserve after Saudi Arabia. Iran might eventually end up in control of almost 20% of the world’s oil reserves.
III. IRAQ’S CIVIL WAR
Today in Iraq, Shia militias—death squads loyal to Iran—have successfully infiltrated the new Iraqi security forces at all levels. They have also expanded their area of operations throughout Iraq. They are responsible for more civilian deaths than the Sunni and foreign insurgents who are the United States’ number one enemies in Iraq. These militias—the Mahdi Army, the Badr Brigade and others—are carrying out attacks under the authority of and in the uniforms of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense. They arrest, kidnap, interrogate, torture and kill anti-Shia and innocent Iraqis.21
For the past year, dozens of corpses have shown up on the streets and garbage dumps of Iraqi cities on a daily basis. In most cases, the victims, who are overwhelmingly Sunni, are blindfolded and handcuffed. Their corpses show signs of torture—broken skulls, burn marks, gouged-out eyeballs, electric drill holes and other forms of abuse. The Shia militias’ secret detention centers are popping up everywhere, even within the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.
The reality is that Iraq is in a state of civil war, and some of its most ruthless and lawless combatants are members of the government’s own security units. Unfortunately, some of them, if not the majority of these new Shia militias, were once part of the new Iraqi security forces and were trained by coalition forces. Coalition forces have spent billions of dollars in training, thinking that these recruits would serve the Iraqis and would be loyal to Iraq instead of following the Iraqi and Iranian religious leaders’ political agendas.22 The current situation in Iraq cannot be fixed by military “hit and run,” moving troops from one hot spot to another. The militias enjoy Iranian military, financial and spiritual leadership. On the other hand, the solution is not to bomb Iran, as doing so will only unleash Iranian forces around the world against neighboring Arab lands where the United States has a presence. What the United States needs to do is to restrain Iran and disarm and disband the Shia militias. These militias are out of control. America must keep Iraq together. It is America’s responsibility to restore order to avoid a civil war that would be similar to the Lebanese Civil War in the 1980s
First, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei announced his appointments to the Expediency Council (EC) — the country’s highest political arbitration body, led by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.
Second, Rafsanjani issued a statement warning his country not to provoke the United States. He added that, at a great financial cost to itself, Washington invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and achieved nothing but serving Tehran’s interests, and “therefore they are angry. So we must be more alert. They are like a wounded tiger, and we must not ignore this.”
[..]
[..] Rafsanjani’s remarks are part of the efforts of his pragmatic conservative faction to create a consensus within the regime on how to deal with the United States. Rafsanjani, who has been a player in Iran in various key capacities since the founding of the republic, is very familiar with U.S. behavior and is therefore trying to get the ultraconservative elements within the regime to realize that they are overplaying their hand and risking the gains Iran has made thus far.
Another key development in Iran is Khamenei’s appointments. The EC was created by a constitutional amendment in 1988 in order to resolve differences between parliament and the Guardians Council (a clerical institution with the power of legislative oversight that also is charged with vetting candidates for public office). In addition, the EC was to advise the supreme leader. Following the domination of the executive and legislative branches by ultraconservatives, Khamenei gave Rafsanjani the power to oversee all three branches of the government and to implement a 20-year plan drafted by the EC.
Khamenei’s appointments were both an effort to consolidate the hold of pragmatic conservatives like Rafsanjani and an attempt to get both factions on the same page.