Victor Davis Hanson in the National Review, Nov 3: “Before Iraq: The assumptions of a forgetful chattering class are badly off the mark” (***)

Long forgotten is the inspired campaign that removed a vicious dictator in three weeks. Nor is much credit given to the idealistic efforts to foster democracy rather than just ignoring the chaos that follows war — as we did after the Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan, or following our precipitous departure from Lebanon and Somalia. And we do not appreciate anymore that Syria was forced to vacate Lebanon; that Libya gave up its WMD arsenal; that Pakistan came clean about Dr. Khan; and that there have been the faint beginnings of local elections in the Gulf monarchies.

Yes, the Middle East is “unstable,” but for the first time in memory, the usual killing, genocide, and terrorism are occurring in a scenario that offers some chance at something better. Long before we arrived in Iraq, the Assads were murdering thousands in Hama, the Husseins were gassing Kurds, and the Lebanese militias were murdering civilians. The violence is not what has changed, but rather the notion that the United States can do nothing about it; the U.S. has shown itself willing to risk much to support freedom in place of tyranny or theocracy in the region.

Instead of recalling any of this, Iraq is seen only in the hindsight of who did what wrong and when. All the great good we accomplished and the high ideals we embraced are drowned out by the present violent insurgency and the sensationalized effort to turn the mayhem into an American Antietam or Yalu River. Blame is never allotted to al Qaeda, the Sadr thugs, or the ex-Baathists, only to the United States, who should have, could have, or would have done better in stopping them, had its leadership read a particular article, fired a certain person, listened to an exceptional general, or studied a key position paper.

Charles Moore in the Telegraph, Nov 4: “From Suez to Iraq: how to weaken the will of the West”

Today, everyone blames the neoconservatives. It reminds me of a remark by Daniel Defoe in the early 18th century that the apprentice boys of London have very little idea of what a Papist is, but thousands of them are more than happy to go out and break his windows. Who in Britain knows that neocons are a phenomenon of the Left and that neither George W. Bush, nor Dick Cheney, nor Donald Rumsfeld has ever been one? Indeed, devilishly clever though neocons may be, they can’t be very good at PR, for they were responsible for about five per cent of the action in Iraq and have attracted about 95 per cent of the blame.

It is not mad ideology that got us into this war – or rather, the madness and the ideology come from our opponents, not from ourselves. If we do pull all our troops out, mock Blair and Bush, and hail some deal with Iran as “peace”, we shall have a few weeks of self-congratulation, but that is all.

The Islamist movements that wait to cheer our withdrawal are not militarily strong, but they are good at what they call “the management of savagery”, and they know that the West’s attention span is much shorter than their own. It is a pity that we seem so determined to prove them right.

Sean M. Maloney on Macleans.ca, Nov 6: “The exit strategy”

Victory in Afghanistan means understanding what we can achieve there, then sticking to it

Any discussion of a Canadian exit strategy for Afghanistan must take into account the reasons we are there in the first place, what we hope to accomplish given the current situation — which has evolved over the course of five years — and how we get there from here. All of this must be balanced against what resources Canada can bring to bear and how those resources are balanced with other national requirements. This is the essence of strategy.

Canada is al-Qaeda’s enemy. We stand for everything they hate, and they cannot be negotiated with — negotiations are neither acceptable nor desired, on either side. The war in Afghanistan is one of several conflicts that fit under the umbrella of the global war against the al-Qaeda movement, what is now referred to as “The Long War.” Afghanistan is but one front: in the Second World War there were operations in Europe, the Atlantic, Pacific, North Africa and so on, but Canada committed mostly to the Atlantic and Europe. In this case, Canada has chosen to focus on Afghanistan and not Iraq, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, nor the streets of Madrid or London.

[..] A lack of perspective in Canada is a continuing problem. False analogies to the Soviet period (and even Vietnam) even figure in parliamentary committee debate: “the Soviets and the British couldn’t succeed, therefore we can’t,” one MP told me. We are not trying to do what the Soviets were attempting, but let’s look at the numbers anyway. The Soviets killed two million Afghan civilians using indiscriminate firepower and socialist societal transformation techniques. Soviet losses from their illegal intervention in 1979 to their withdrawal in 1989, we now believe, were around 28,000 killed over 10 years, or 2,800 per year. NATO and OEF losses over a five-year period are around 500. We are not employing indiscriminate firepower, there are comparatively few civilian casualties, and we are there in support of a legitimate, elected government. There is no real comparison.

[..]Canada will be walking out the front gate when we feel the job is done, not slink out some dark back window when the going gets rough. After the disasters at Hong Kong and Dieppe during the Second World War, it was difficult if not impossible to see victory three and four years later in 1945. In the dark days of 1995, we never believed that peace could be achieved in Bosnia, yet in 2004 the situation was stable enough for Canada to withdraw. We are in a stronger position in Afghanistan against our enemies now than we were in the Balkans five years in, and during the first years of the Second World War: let’s not throw it away and say it was all in vain because of ignorance and fear.

Nibras Kazimi in the NY Sun, Nov 6: “Something Is Changing”

Lately, I’ve been hearing worrisome things about the Iraq Study Group. James Baker, the co-chairman of this congressionally mandated bipartisan body, reportedly is going to recommend some radical strategic changes in America’s Iraq policy. But my worries were laid to rest last week when President Bush made it very clear that he is indeed staying the course, even though he put some rhetorical distance between himself and the loaded catchphrase.

According to multiple sources, the Baker report, to be released late November, will counsel burying the “democracy as stability” doctrine for the Middle East and also recommend opening lines of communication with Iraqi insurgents and their cheerleaders in Iran and Syria. Furthermore, the Saudis will be brought in to “fix” Iraq — just as they were asked to step in and fix Lebanon in the early 1990s.

The report, arriving at a politically melodramatic moment for Mr. Bush’s political opponents at home, will likely find favor among foreign opponents to Mr. Bush’s vision for the Middle East. But Mr. Bush, whose instincts are commonsensical, is likely to send the report back with some pertinent questions scribbled in the margins:
[..]
But Jim, there is one thing I’d like to know and that is why did Lieutenant Mohammad Hikmet al-Badrani, a young Iraqi Sunni from Mosul, keep firing his weapon when attacked by the insurgents two weeks ago, and why did he give up his life for a new Iraq?

It is easy for journalists to ride the ” Iraq is failing” wave and churn out the safe stories that tell us that all is bad. It is much harder for them to make sense of why so many Iraqi policemen and soldiers are fighting back when attacked rather than dropping their weapons and cowering for safety. Something is changing in Iraq, and it is happening despite the serial bungling of Mr. Maliki’s government or the incessant predictions of an American withdrawal. It is happening because more and more Iraqis understand what is at stake should those murderous insurgents win.

Would Lieutenant Badrani have cut and run had he been aware of Mr. Baker’s wobbly recommendations? I don’t think so. And I don’t think that Mr. Bush’s resolve on this long course ahead will fail either.

James Q. Wilson in the Wall Street Journal, Nov 6, “The Press at War: What ever happened to patriotic reporters? “

Between Jan. 1 and Sept. 30, 2005, nearly 1,400 stories appeared on the ABC, CBS and NBC evening news. More than half focused on the costs and problems of the war, four times as many as those that discussed the successes. About 40% of the stories reported terrorist attacks; scarcely any reported the triumphs of American soldiers and Marines. The few positive stories about progress in Iraq were just a small fraction of all the broadcasts.

When the Center for Media and Public Affairs made a nonpartisan evaluation of network news broadcasts, it found that during the active war against Saddam Hussein, 51% of the reports about the conflict were negative. Six months after the land battle ended, 77% were negative; in the 2004 general election, 89% were negative; by the spring of 2006, 94% were negative. This decline in media support was much faster than during Korea or Vietnam.

Naturally, some of the hostile commentary reflects the nature of reporting. When every news outlet struggles to grab and hold an audience, no one should be surprised that this competition leads journalists to emphasize bloody events. To some degree, the press covers Iraq in much the same way that it covers America: it highlights conflict, shootings, bombings, hurricanes, tornadoes, and corruption.

But the war coverage does not reflect merely an interest in conflict. People who oppose the entire war on terror run much of the national press, and they go to great lengths to make waging it difficult.